Protecting the Antiterrorism Tools of American Citizens: Limiting the Application of Daimler\u27s  At-Home  Test by Alexis Casamassima
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 90 
Number 4 Volume 90, Winter 2016, Number 4 Article 8 
April 2017 
Protecting the Antiterrorism Tools of American Citizens: Limiting 
the Application of Daimler's "At-Home" Test 
Alexis Casamassima 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Alexis Casamassima (2016) "Protecting the Antiterrorism Tools of American Citizens: Limiting the 
Application of Daimler's "At-Home" Test," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 90 : No. 4 , Article 8. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol90/iss4/8 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
1115 
PROTECTING THE ANTITERRORISM 
TOOLS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS: LIMITING 




One morning, a father leaves for work, a mother prepares for a 
holiday meal, a brother shovels snow from the sidewalk, a 
teenager anticipates a reunion with a sister, daughters wave 
goodbye to their parents.  It is pretty much a typical American 
day in a typical American life. 
But then something happens that forever changes this life.  Life 
will never be the same again.  A terrorist, for reasons nobody 
understands, for reasons beyond the concept of humanity, blows 
a plane out of the air or hijacks a ship or shoots a father, 
murders a wife, husband, sister, or brother.1 
“Terrorism is the premeditated use or threat [of] violence by 
individuals or subnational groups to obtain a political or social 
objective through the intimidation of a large audience, beyond 
that of the immediate victims.2”  Throughout the past three 
† Senior Staff, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2017, St. John’s 
University School of Law. A special thank you to Assistant Dean Jeffrey Walker for 
his invaluable guidance in the research and writing of this Note. Additionally, I 
thank my parents for playing such an influential role in my life. I will forever 
cherish the undying support and encouragement you provide me in all my life 
endeavors. 
1 Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts & Admin. Practice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 1 (1990) 
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley). 
2 Todd Sandler, The Analytical Study of Terrorism: Taking Stock, 51 J. PEACE 
RES. 257 (2014). It is difficult to uniformly define the term “terrorism” because its 
meaning varies in different countries. This is the precise reason why the United 
Nations has struggled and has never actually defined the term. U.N. 101: There Is 
No UN Definition of Terrorism, HUMAN RIGHTS VOICES, http://www.humanrights 
voices.org/eyeontheun/un_101/facts/?p=61 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
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decades, terrorism radically evolved in terms of who is carrying 
out the attacks, why, and how.3  The 2015 Global Terrorism 
Index reported the total number of deaths from terrorism to be 
the greatest in history and found that terrorism is impacting 
more countries than ever before.4  Despite these shocking 
numbers, deaths related to domestic terrorism have not sharply 
increased as compared to international terrorism.5 
Twenty-five years ago, United States Congress recognized 
two distinct principles regarding terrorism.  First, Congress 
recognized the imperative role money plays: “[Funding] is the 
oxygen of terrorism.”6  Without funding, terrorists cannot build 
an organizational structure to carry out attacks.7  Second, 
Congress acknowledged the lack of tools American citizens have 
available in fighting international terrorism through financial 
recovery for injuries caused by terrorist groups. 
In pursuit of these goals, Congress granted Americans, 
acting in their individual capacity, the right to bring civil actions 
against those responsible for terrorist acts through the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1992 (“ATA”).8  In enacting this law, Congress 
provided a new mode to deprive terrorists of money while 
bringing justice to Americans harmed by international terrorism. 
3 The forms of terrorism we witness today, we could not have envisioned thirty 
years ago. The National Security Research Division has studied this evolution and 
analyzed modern terrorism trends: (1) terrorism has become bloodier; (2) terrorists 
have developed new financial resources; (3) terrorists have evolved new models of 
organization; and (4) terrorists have exploited new communication technologies. 
Brian Michael Jenkins, The New Age of Terrorism, in The McGraw-Hill Homeland 
Security Handbook 117–18 (2006). 
4 INST. FOR ECON. & PEACE, GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2015: MEASURING AND 
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM 9 (2015) (“The total number of deaths 
from terrorism in 2014 reached 32,685, constituting an 80 per cent increase from 
18,111 the previous year.”). 
5 Id. (“Attacks in Western countries accounted for a small percentage incidents, 
representing 4.4 per cent of terrorist incidents and 2.6 per cent of deaths over the 
last 15 years.”). 
6 Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Remarks to Executives Club of Chicago 
Leadership Symposium, Impact of Global Terrorism (Mar. 14, 2002), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/8839.htm. 
7 Gerald P. O’Driscoll et al., Stopping Terrorism: Follow the Money, HERITAGE 
FOUND.: HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
2001/09/stopping-terrorism-follow-the-money (“Terrorism is a business the fruits of 
which are nurtured by . . . financial flows. Cut off these flows, and the terrorist’s 
activities will be stunted no matter how fanatical the devotion of their followers.”). 
8 The ATA was originally enacted in 1990, but due to a procedural error, the Act 
was repealed and later reenacted in 1992. See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012); Licci v. 
Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 68 n.19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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Throughout the last two decades, Americans have pursued 
damages under the Act and brought numerous types of terrorist 
actors to justice, including third-party actors like corporations, 
financial institutions, and quasi-government entities.  In these 
actions, courts have allowed American plaintiffs to hold third 
parties liable when there was a showing of material support.9 
Nonetheless, as a result of a recent United States Supreme 
Court precedential case, the practice of bringing foreign sponsors 
of terrorism into U.S. jurisdictions has been called into question. 
In 2015, plaintiffs in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York (“S.D.N.Y.”) won a $655.5 million 
verdict against the Palestine Liberation Organization under the 
ATA’s civil provision.10  Plaintiff’s victory was achieved in light of 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 
where the Court imposed a new, stricter standard on federal 
courts attempting to exercise general jurisdiction over foreign 
individuals and corporate defendants.11  The S.D.N.Y. found that 
Daimler did not preclude personal jurisdiction in exceptional 
cases involving acts of terror.12  However, this decision was 
recently overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit.13  The Second Circuit adopted a position endorsed 
by several cases coming out of the District Court for the District 
of Columbia (“D.D.C.”), which have all ruled that federal courts 
can no longer exercise jurisdiction over foreign sponsors of 
terrorism as a result of Daimler.14 
This Note argues that courts should not apply the Daimler 
general jurisdiction standard to defendants in ATA civil 
proceedings, because (1) it was not intended to insulate certain 
9 But see Alison Bitterly, Note, Can Banks Be Liable for Aiding and Abetting 
Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Under the 
Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3391 (2015) (noting that the circuits 
are in disagreement over whether secondary liability should extend to third parties 
indirectly involved with the carrying out of terrorist attacks). 
10 Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow IV), No. 04 CIVIL 00397 
(GBD), 2015 WL 10852003, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2015), vacated, Waldman v. 
Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 2016); see also 18. U.S.C. § 2333(a) 
(2012) (allowing for treble damages). 
11 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
12 Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow III), No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 
2014 WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014). 
13 Waldman, 835 F.3d 317. 
14 Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth. (Klieman II), 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 
(D.D.C. 2015); Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 31 (D.D.C. 2015); 
Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 49 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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foreign terrorist sponsors from these actions and (2) applying 
Daimler would seriously undermine the purpose of the ATA’s 
civil provision.15  Part I surveys the jurisdictional requirements 
that must be satisfied to bring foreign defendants into federal 
court.  Part II discusses the position of various courts on the 
issue of whether foreign defendants in ATA civil actions can be 
subject to the federal jurisdiction on the basis of Daimler’s 
standards.  Part III urges the Supreme Court to exempt ATA 
civil actions from Daimler’s standard to ensure that Americans 
can continue bringing such suits against sponsors of terrorism. 
Finally, Part IV explains why Daimler cannot apply to foreign 
defendants in ATA civil actions without creating virtual 
immunity for certain classes of terrorist sponsors and 
undermining the purposes of the ATA. 
I. ACQUIRING FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN
DEFENDANTS WHO ALLEGEDLY SPONSOR TERRORISM
Foreign defendants can only be brought into federal court 
when the court can properly exercise jurisdiction over them.16  To 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, the plaintiff has 
the burden of establishing both personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant and subject-matter jurisdiction over the cause of 
action.17  Personal jurisdiction is limited by the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.18  The breadth of personal jurisdiction 
allowed by the Due Process Clause has been a long-standing 
issue in federal jurisprudence, but the United States Supreme 
Court recently attempted to resolve this uncertainty by creating 
a definitive test.19  In contrast, through its constitutional grant of 
power, Congress can create subject-matter jurisdiction by passing 
federal legislation to provide Article III courts the authority to 
15 In articulating this argument, this Note focuses on the application of 
Daimler’s ruling to the Palestinian Liberation Organization, a foreign quasi-
government, unincorporated entity. 
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)–(2). 
17 See id.; Jason A. Yonan, Note, An End to Judicial Overreaching in 
Nationwide Service of Process Cases: Statutory Authorization To Bring Supplemental 
Personal Jurisdiction Within Federal Courts’ Powers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 557, 559 
(2002). 
18 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011). 
19 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 756–57 (2014). 
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hear specific issues.20  For example, by enacting the ATA, 
Congress authorized the courts to hear matters arising out of 
acts of international terrorism.21 
A. Evolution of Personal Jurisdiction in the United States
United States Supreme Court precedent for the
requirements of personal jurisdiction to satisfy due process has 
evolved for nearly two centuries.  Personal jurisdiction was first 
articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff22 in which the Court took a strict 
territorial approach.  Under this approach, the Court interpreted 
due process to allow a defendant to be subject to state court 
authority only if (1) he was served notice within the state, or 
(2) through a proceeding against instate property the defendant
owned.23  However, this standard became frustrated with an
evolving American society.24  Advances in technology made it
easier for defendants to be transient between states and, thus,
made it increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to locate and serve
defendants within state lines.25
The Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington 
recognized and resolved the issue of taking a strict territorial 
approach to personal jurisdiction by broadening its interpretation 
of due process.26  In determining the scope of the Due Process 
Clause, the Court declared that personal jurisdiction could be 
satisfied by either specific or general jurisdiction.27  Specific 
jurisdiction arose when the defendant’s conduct in the state gave 
rise to the cause of action.28  General jurisdiction, however, 
allowed for nonresident defendants to be haled into court for 
conduct occurring outside the state.  For causes of actions arising 
outside the state, a foreign defendant could be subject to 
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; Id. art. III, § 1. 
21 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). 
22 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
23 Id. at 724. 
24 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (“In the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries, changes in the technology of transportation and 
communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate business activity, led to an 
‘inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction’ over nonresident 
individuals and corporations.” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) 
(Black, J., dissenting))). 
25 See id. 
26 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
27 Id. at 316. 
28 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
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jurisdiction if (1) the defendant had minimum contacts within 
the forum and (2) subjecting the defendant to that forum’s 
jurisdiction would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”29 
To determine whether a defendant had minimum contacts to 
satisfy general jurisdiction, the analysis focused on (1) whether 
the defendant’s activities in that state were systematic and 
continuous, and (2) whether those contacts availed the defendant 
to the benefits and protection of the laws of that state.30  For 
example, the Court in International Shoe observed that the 
defendant corporation had sufficient minimum contacts in 
Washington.31  Although the corporation did not have an office in 
Washington, various company packages travelled in intrastate 
commerce, and the salesmen were permanent Washington State 
residents, regularly solicited orders within the state, and rented 
space in hotels to display company product.32  The Court held this 
surpassed the threshold of required contacts needed to 
constitutionally hale the defendant corporation into the forum. 
The Court also stressed that availing oneself to the benefits of 
the state created certain obligations, including answering to 
injured plaintiffs.33 
After International Shoe, state governments acted to ensure 
that personal jurisdiction did not just end at the state border by 
enacting long-arm statutes.34  Long-arm statutes codified 
International Shoe’s holding and its two-part test.35  
Subsequently, Congress followed the states by enacting the 
federal long-arm statute.36 
However, the scope of general jurisdiction has since been 
narrowed by two Supreme Court cases.  In Goodyear, the Court 
eliminated a jurisdictional theory that would allow foreign 
corporate defendants to be brought into United States courts 
solely on the premise that their commercial product located in 
29 Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)). 
30 Id. at 319. 
31 Id. at 320. 
32 Id. at 313–14. 
33 Id. at 319. 
34 Dane Reed Ullian, Note, Retroactive Application of State Long-Arm Statutes, 
65 FLA. L. REV., 1653, 1659 (2013). 
35 E.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) (McKinney 2016). 
36 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). 
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the forum created jurisdiction for a cause of action that occurred 
wholly outside the forum.37  It was in this decision that the Court 
first articulated the “at-home” standard.38 
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court reaffirmed and applied 
the at-home standard.  The Daimler litigation was instituted by 
foreign Argentinian plaintiffs alleging violations of U.S. human-
right laws for conduct occurring entirely in Argentina.39  
Plaintiffs sought to hold Daimler AG, a German corporation, 
vicariously liable for the alleged conduct of its subsidiary, MB 
Argentina.40  MB Argentina purportedly collaborated with 
Argentinian forces to harm plaintiffs and their relatives during 
Argentina’s military dictatorship period, known as the “Dirty 
War.”41  Although the litigation was premised on U.S. law, both 
parties were foreign, and the cause of action occurred abroad. 
Naturally, this raised the question of whether or not the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California could 
properly exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the foreign 
defendant.42 
At the district court level, plaintiffs asserted two theories of 
jurisdiction.  First, they alleged that Daimler itself had sufficient 
contacts with California under International Shoe’s minimum 
contacts test.43  In the alternative, they argued jurisdiction could 
be premised under an agency theory.44  Ultimately, the court 
concluded that jurisdiction could not be exercised under either 
theory.45  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
37 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 930 
(2011). Under this theory, known as the stream of commerce theory, a defendant 
that puts a product into the marketplace creates ties with every forum in which his 
product winds up. Id. at 926. The plaintiffs were trying to broaden the scope of 
general jurisdiction by subjecting Goodyear Tire’s foreign subsidiaries in France, 
Luxemburg, and Germany to litigation in any jurisdiction touched by the company’s 
distribution chain. Id. at 918. 
38 Id. at 929. 
39 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750–51 (2014). 
40 Id. at 752. 
41 Id. at 751. 
42 Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG (DaimlerChrysler I), No. C-04-00194 RMW, 
2005 WL 3157472, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). 
43 Id. at *5. 
44 Id. at *10. Under this theory, plaintiffs asserted the contacts of Daimler’s U.S. 
subsidiary, MBUSA, could be imputed upon Daimler because MBUSA can be 
classified as Daimler’s agent. Id. 
45 Before coming to a final decision, the court did allow for limited jurisdictional 
discovery on the agency theory only. Id. at *19. However, following discovery, the 
court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Bauman v. 
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Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding and found that 
it was reasonable to premise jurisdiction under the agency 
theory.46  Thereafter, Daimler petitioned for writ of certiorari, 
and, in April of 2013, the Supreme Court granted it.47 
The issue on appeal was “whether, consistent with the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Daimler [wa]s 
amenable to suit in California courts for claims involving only 
foreign plaintiffs and conduct occurring entirely abroad.”48  
Although the Court acknowledged that the agency theory can be 
grounds for general jurisdiction in some cases, it found that the 
Ninth Circuit applied the principles too loosely and, in doing so, 
impermissibly expanded the reach of general jurisdiction.49  
Instead, the Court focused its analysis on Daimler’s own contacts 
with California, absent the MBUSA connection. 
The Court surveyed general jurisdiction jurisprudence and 
held that jurisdiction could not be exended constitutionally over 
Daimler.50  In acknowledging that International Shoe opened the 
court’s doors to widespread litigation against nonresident and 
foreign defendants, the Court emphasized that general 
jurisdiction still imposed a high burden.51  In interpreting this 
burden, the Court declared a new standard.  No longer would it 
be reasonable to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants on 
the basis of minimum contacts. 
Under the Court’s new general jurisdiction standard, a 
plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) the foreign defendant 
must have systematic and continuous contacts in the forum; 
(2) those contacts must render the defendant at home in that
forum; and (3) exercising jurisdiction over the defendant must be
DaimlerChrysler AG (DaimlerChrysler II), No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389, 
at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007), rev’d sub nom. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. 
(DaimlerChrysler III), 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011). 
46 DaimlerChrysler III, 644 F.3d at 931 (“To the ordinary American, and 
certainly to us, it would seem odd, indeed, if the manufacturer of Mercedes-Benz, 
which are sold in California in vast numbers by its American subsidiary, for use on 
the state’s streets and highways, could not be required to appear in the federal 
courts of that state.”). 
47 DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman (DaimlerChrysler IV), 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013). 
48 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014). 
49 Id. at 759. Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, any foreign company could 
essentially be subject to U.S. jurisdiction in any state where it had a subsidiary. Id. 
at 759–60. 
50 Id. at 753–58. 
51 See id. at 755; see also Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 
(1952); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
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reasonable to comport with due-process standards.52  To 
determine whether a defendant is at home in the forum, the 
Court provided guidelines directed at individuals and 
corporations.53  A corporation will always be deemed at home in 
its place of incorporation and principal place of business.54  The 
Court noted this analysis was not absolute and a corporation 
could still potentially be subject to general jurisdiction outside of 
those two identifiable forums.55  However, no guidelines were 
provided to determine these exceptional cases of when general 
jurisdiction would arise outside the forum in which the 
corporation was incorporated or had its principal place of 
business.56 
In applying this framework to the facts, the Court concluded 
that general jurisdiction could not be exercised over Daimler. 
Daimler is not at home in California because it is neither 
incorporated nor has its principal place of business there.57  
Additionally, the Court noted that even if MBUSA’s contacts 
were imputed to Daimler, it would still be insufficient to render 
Daimler at home in California.58  The Court reasoned that the 
underlying principle of general jurisdiction is to give defendants 
certainty as to where they may be amenable to lawsuits, 
therefore bringing Daimler into a California court would violate 
this principle.59  The Court stressed that narrowing the analysis 
to a corporation’s place of incorporation and principal place of 
business makes it easier for both plaintiffs and defendants to 
ascertain suitable forums for litigation.60 
52 See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (adding to International Shoe inquiry by 
interpreting Goodyear to additionally require contacts that render the defendant at 
home within the state). 
53 Id. at 760. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 See id. 
57 Id. at 761. Because Daimler did not satisfy either of these paradigm forums, 
the Court acknowledged that Daimler was essentially immune to U.S. litigation on 
this matter. 
58 Id. at 761–62. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 760. 
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B. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992: § 2333(a) Civil Cases
To bring an action in federal court, there must be a cause of
action that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction over. 
Congress has the ability to broaden federal court’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction to include causes of action that previously did not 
exist.  For example, in October of 1985, the Klinghoffer family 
was vacationing on the Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro.61  
While out at sea, the cruise ship was seized.62  Leon Klinghoffer, 
a father who was restricted to a wheelchair, was shot and thrown 
into the Mediterranean by terrorists as his family was forced to 
watch.63  His surviving family brought a civil suit against the 
cruise line in S.D.N.Y. in which the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (“PLO”) was impleaded.64  It was alleged that 
members of the PLO carried out the seizure and subsequent 
terrorist attacks on the ship. 
The federal district court needed to decide if it could properly 
exercise jurisdiction over the PLO,65 a foreign unincorporated 
association for the Palestinian people.  The court found that the 
PLO had sufficient contacts in New York to satisfy personal 
jurisdiction.66  It premised subject-matter jurisdiction on 
admiralty law, because the cause of action arose in international 
waters.67  This was the first time a foreign terrorist organization 
was haled into a U.S. courtroom.68 
Although this case was viewed as a triumph over terrorism,69 
the limitations of the jurisdictional ruling became evident.70  
61 Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro 
in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp. 854, 856 (1990). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 857. 
65 See infra Section II.A (explaining the PLO). 
66 Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 861–63 (applying general jurisdiction principles 
articulated in International Shoe). 
67 Id. at 859. 
68 Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko). 
69 The case never proceeded to trial because the PLO and Klinghoffer family 
agreed to an out-of-court settlement for an undisclosed sum. Benjamin Weiser, A 
Settlement with P.L.O. Over Terror on a Cruise, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 1997), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1997/08/12/world/a-settlement-with-plo-over-terror-on-a-cruise.h 
tml. 
70 Hearings, supra note 1, at 61 (statement of The Leon and Marilyn Klinghoffer 
Memorial Foundation) (“If the killing had taken place upon an aircraft or on another 
nation’s soil, the court may well have rejected our attempt to recover from the PLO 
for the harms inflicted upon my family.”). 
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Antiterrorism law at the time only provided for criminal 
penalties over international terrorism acts involving U.S. 
citizens.71  No statute specifically granted civil jurisdiction over 
terrorist activity abroad.  The Klinghoffers were able to satisfy 
the jurisdictional requirements, not because the case involved 
terrorism, but because the case was at sea.  United States 
Senator Grassley recognized this problem and responded by 
introducing Senate Bill 2465.72  The bill was structured to expand 
the Klinghoffer ruling by granting federal district courts the 
power to hear a civil cause of action involving an American 
citizen injured by an international act of terrorism.73 
The contents of Senate Bill 2465 was eventually passed into 
law74 pursuant to Congress’s power to “define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 
against the Law of Nations.”75  The enactment was known as the 
Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”).  Section 2333(a) of the ATA grants: 
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person, 
property, or business by reason of an act of international 
terrorism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue 
therefor in any appropriate district court of the United States 
and shall recover threefold the damages he or she sustains and 
the cost of the suit, including attorney’s fees.76 
The statute was constructed vaguely.  The language of the 
statute states that a private citizen can bring a civil action 
against someone who commits “an act of international 
terrorism.”77  However, it does not explicitly specify if these 
actions can only be brought against the perpetrator of the attack 
or someone indirectly involved, for example a sponsor.  To 
provide some jurisdictional guidelines, Wendy Collins Perdue, a 
Georgetown University Law Center civil procedure professor, 
answered related questions at the bill’s Subcommittee Hearing.78 
71 See 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2012). 
72 Senate Bill 2465 was originally introduced in the 101st Congress, but it was 
Senate Bill 1569 that was ultimately passed into law in the following Congress. S. 
Res. 1569, 102d Cong. (1992) (enacted). 
73 Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko). 
74 Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 
4506. 
75 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
76 18 U.S.C § 2333(a) (2012). 
77 Id. 
78 Hearings, supra note 1, at 121 (statement of Professor Wendy Collins Perdue). 
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Professor Perdue acknowledged the possibility that 
jurisdiction could extend beyond the actual perpetrator.  She 
stated that jurisdiction could likely be exercised over an entity or 
corporation involved with a terrorist attack by satisfying the 
minimum contacts test as laid out in International Shoe.79  
Notably, she stated that plaintiffs would only realistically be able 
to recover from an entity with assets, as opposed to the 
individual terrorist that carried out the attack.80  She admitted 
the language was unclear, but again, reaffirmed that if victims 
were to be provided “any meaningful remedy, liability must 
extend beyond the few individuals who actually execute the 
terrorist act.”81 
Ultimately, whether the ATA extended beyond the mere 
perpetrator to a third party was a question to be decided by the 
courts.82  Section 2333(a) was first interpreted in Boim v. Quranic 
Literacy Institute.83  In Boim, the court addressed whether 
jurisdiction could properly be exercised over two organizations 
that allegedly provided material support to the terrorists that 
murdered a seventeen-year-old American boy waiting at a bus 
stop in Israel.84  In answering that question, the court analyzed 
the potential class of defendants within the jurisdictional scope of 
§ 2333(a).
First, to determine potential defendants that could be sued 
under § 2333(a), the court looked to the plain language of the 
statue to determine Congress’s intent.85  The court focused on the 
word “involve” in the statute’s definition of “international 
terrorism” to determine which class of defendants the statute 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 126 (“It is the organizations, businesses and nations who support, 
encourage and supply terrorists who are likely to have reachable assets.”); see also 
Geoffrey Sant, So Banks Are Terrorists Now?: The Misuse of the Civil Suit Provision 
of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 533, 547 (2013) (“It may be exceedingly 
rare for a terrorist group to have attachable assets in the United States, but where 
such a terrorist group exists, it should be subject to suit.”). 
81 Hearings, supra note 1, at 127. 
82 See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002) (noting it is the job 
of the courts to interpret Congressional statutory language). 
83 Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 (7th Cir. 2002). 
84 Id. at 1002–03. 
85 Id. at 1009. 
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was meant to include.86  However, the plain language of the 
statute could not provide further insight as to a potential class of 
defendants. 
Next, the court looked to the statute’s legislative history and 
to tort law principles.87  In reviewing the Senate Report, the court 
concluded that the statute was “clearly . . . meant to reach 
beyond those persons who themselves commit the violent act that 
directly causes the injury.”88  Given Congress’s intent, the court 
construed the statute broadly and explained a broad statutory 
construction was imperative because, similar to tort law, drafters 
cannot anticipate the wide variety of fact patterns that will fall 
within the statute’s confines.89 
Again, in Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the court was 
faced with a § 2333(a) case.90  The Wultz case arose out of a 
suicide bombing occurring in a Tel Aviv restaurant that killed a 
sixteen-year-old American boy, Daniel Wultz.91  Daniel’s family 
brought the litigation under the ATA alleging that the defendant, 
the Bank of China, knowingly executed dozens of wire transfers, 
totaling several million dollars, to the attacker’s organization, 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.92  Similar to Boim, the issue was 
whether secondary liability could be attributed to the defendant 
under the ATA’s civil action provision for executing the wire 
transfers that furthered the terrorist attack.93 
86 Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A) (2012) (defining international terrorism as 
“activities that . . . involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any 
State”). 
87 Boim, 291 F.3d at 1011. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 1011–12. Ultimately, on the facts presented before the court, the court 
held that simply making a financial contribution to a terrorist organization does not 
subject that actor to § 2333(a) liability. Id. at 1028. However, the court did say that 
funding by an organization would be subject to liability if it fell into the aiding and 
abetting category. Id. Embracing this theory, several plaintiffs have sought damages 
from a variety of banks, such as Bank of China, Credit Lyonnais SA, HSBC, and 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group. See, e.g., Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., No. CV-06-
0702 (CPS), 2006 WL 2862704 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2006). 
90 755 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). 
91 Id. at 18. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 54. 
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In trying to decipher whether the statutory language of 
§ 2333(a) extended to secondary actors, the court started with the
general presumption that plaintiffs in civil actions cannot sue
parties that allegedly aid or abet.94  However, because Congress
expressly created a private right of action by enacting § 2333(a)
and used broad statutory language, the court concluded that tort
law principles applied to the statute and overrides the
presumption.95  Hence, the courts in both Boim and Wultz agreed
that liability under § 2333(a) extended beyond the mere
perpetrator.
II. DAIMLER’S APPLICATION IN § 2333(A) CASES
The United States Supreme Court, in articulating a new 
general jurisdiction standard, did not account for the difficulty 
lower courts would face in its application.  After the Supreme 
Court issued its Daimler decision, courts immediately adjusted 
the general jurisdiction analysis.  However, application of the 
test has proved to be challenging.  For example, the United 
States District Courts for the Southern District of New York 
(“S.D.N.Y.”) and District of Columbia (“D.D.C.”) have applied 
Daimler to ATA § 2333(a) foreign defendants and have reached 
contrasting decisions.  More recently, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the S.D.N.Y. decision 
and adopted the position set forth in the D.D.C. opinions. 
However, a review by the Second Circuit or a writ of certiorari 
may be filed by the plaintiffs in the S.D.N.Y. case.96 
A. The PLO and PA: Representatives for a Unified Palestine
The PLO was formed as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict that has evolved over the past century.  The main issue 
involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is “whether the 
Palestinian people should be allowed to form their own 
independent country and government in an area that is currently 
94 Id. at 55 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994)). 
95 Id. 
96 Hana Levi Julian, US 2nd Circuit Appeals Court Reverses Anti-Terror Verdict 
Against Palestinian Authority, PLO, JEWISH PRESS: NEWS & VIEWS (Aug. 31, 2016), 
http://www.jewishpress.com/news/breaking-news/us-2nd-circuit-appeals-court-
reverses-anti-terror-verdict-against-palestinian-authority-plo/2016/08/31. 
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part of the nation of Israel.”97  The conflicting views of Israelis 
and Palestinians are exhibited through the various military 
invasions, instability, and violence that the region has endured 
for decades.98  Peace has never been reached and the conflict 
continues to persist today.99 
The PLO was formed to create a “central leadership” body for 
Palestinians in order to liberate their people and form a 
Palestinian region.100  Since its creation in 1964, numerous 
attacks in Israel have been attributed to the PLO, and the 
organization has continuously made appearances on and off the 
United States’s list of foreign terrorist organizations.101  When 
the organization acquired some rights in the West Bank and 
Gaza in 1993, the PLO formed the PA to focus its mission in that 
region.102 
97 An Overview of Relations Between Israel and Palestine, EBSCO HOST: 
POLITICS, http://connection.ebscohost.com/politics/israel-palestinians/overview-relat 
ions-between-israel-and-palestine (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). 
98 See Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, THOMSON REUTERS FOUND.: NEWS, http:// 
www.trust.org/spotlight/Israeli-Palestinian-conflict/?tab=briefing (last updated July 
23, 2014). 
99 See id.; see, e.g., Ben Wedeman, Israeli-Palestinian Violence: What You Need 
To Know, CNN (Oct. 15, 2015, 8:32 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/14/middleeast/ 
israel-palestinians-violence-explainer. 
100 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http:// 
www.britannica.com/topic/Palestine-Liberation-Organization (last updated Aug. 25, 
2009). In the Klinghoffer case, the court noted the PLO’s description of their 
organization: 
[T]he internationally recognized representative of a sovereign people who
are seeking to exercise their rights to self-determination, national
independence, and territorial integrity. The PLO is the internationally
recognized embodiment of the nationhood and sovereignty of the
Palestinian people while they await the restoration of their rights through
the establishment of a [comprehensive], just and lasting peace in the
Middle East.
Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in 
Amministrazione Straordinaria, 739 F. Supp. 854, 857 (1990). 
101 Adam Kredo, Congress Works To Shutter Palestine Liberation Organization 
D.C. Office, WASH. FREE BEACON (Feb. 11, 2016, 1:35 PM), http://freebeacon.com/na
tional-security/congress-works-to-shutter-palestine-liberation-organization-d-c-office/
print; S. Res. 2537, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).
102 Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow II), 60 F. Supp. 3d 509, 513 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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B. S.D.N.Y. District Court Does Not Allow Daimler To Preclude 
General Jurisdiction 
In 2014, an S.D.N.Y. District Court announced that despite 
the recent Supreme Court ruling in Daimler, private U.S. 
citizens were allowed to institute a civil action against the PLO 
and the PA.103  The litigation, Sokolow v. PLO, focused on a series 
of terrorist attacks, occurring in and around Jerusalem between 
2001 and 2004, that left U.S. citizens either killed or seriously 
injured.104  The plaintiffs105 sought to exercise their right under 
ATA § 2333(a) to commence a civil proceeding against actors of 
international terrorism.106  The PLO and PA were named 
defendants for alleged involvement in planning, carrying out, and 
rewarding the perpetrators of the various attacks.107 
Subsequently, the PLO and the PA moved to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.108  In determining 
whether the foreign defendants were amenable to U.S. 
jurisdiction, the court first articulated the standard:  “In the 
context of ATA litigation, a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing 
of personal jurisdiction if: (1) service of process was properly 
effected as to the defendant109 . . . and (2) the defendant has 
sufficient minimum contacts with the United States as a whole to 
satisfy a traditional due process analysis.”110  Hence, the court 
followed the conventional International Shoe inquiry of minimum 
contacts and availing itself of the forum.111 
The court’s analysis disclosed that the PLO and PA had 
surpassed the minimum threshold of contacts required.  First, 
the PLO and PA operated a fully functional office in Washington, 
D.C.112  Additionally, to run the office, they engaged in multiple
commercial contracts with U.S. businesses, including for office
supplies and equipment, postage, shipping, news
103 Id. at 509. 
104 Id. at 512. 
105 The plaintiffs were the guardians, family members, and personal 
representatives of the estates of the citizens killed or injured in the terrorist attacks. 
Id. 
106 Id. at 515. 
107 Id. at 512–13. 
108 Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org. (Sokolow I), No. 04 CV 00397(GBD), 
2011 WL 1345086, at *1 (S.D.N.Y Mar. 30, 2011). 
109 Defendants did not contest service. Id. at *2. 
110 Id. 
111 See id. at *3. 
112 Id. 
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services/subscriptions, telecommunications, Internet, IT support, 
accounting and legal services, and credit cards.113  Second, PLO 
and PA employees engaged in a variety of promotional 
endeavors, including interviews and speeches, that were usually 
broadcasted on major national U.S. news networks.114  Third, 
they managed two domestic bank accounts and a Certificate of 
Deposit account.115  Fourth, the PA entered into a multiyear, 
multimillion-dollar contract with a U.S. consulting and lobbying 
firm for the purpose of having their agents represent the PA in 
political activities to broadcast their mission.116 
In determining the reasonableness of subjecting the 
defendants to U.S. jurisdiction, the defendants did not meet their 
burden of establishing a due process violation.117  The court noted 
that the defendants were subject to U.S. jurisdiction on 
numerous occasions in the past and had rigorously defended 
these litigations.118  Thus, the court denied the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss, a conclusion consistent with other federal 
courts that have applied the International Shoe framework to the 
PLO and PA. 
However, after the Supreme Court decided Daimler, the 
defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that 
the court no longer could exercise personal jurisdiction over 
them.119  Defendants argued that under Daimler and a Second 
Circuit case adopting Daimler, their U.S. activities were 
substantially smaller compared to their global activities, 
meaning they could not be rendered “at home” within the U.S.120 
The court ruled that Daimler did not preclude the lawsuit 
and maintained that personal jurisdiction could still be properly 
exercised.121  First, it highlighted the Court’s admittance that the 
new standard was not absolute; not every defendant falls within 
the paradigm corporate forums laid out in Daimler.122  Second, 




117 Id. at *7. 
118 Id. 
119 Sokolow III, No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014 WL 6811395, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 
2014). 
120 See id. (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
121 Id. at *2. 
122 See id. 
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the defendants did not produce evidence to establish that they 
were at home somewhere other than the U.S.123  Therefore, the 
court reaffirmed its previous finding of personal jurisdiction.124 
Because the court could properly exercise jurisdiction over 
the defendants, the case proceeded to a jury trial.  Ultimately, 
the jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and returned a $218.5 
million verdict, which was increased to $655.5 million in 
accordance with ATA’s treble damages provision.125 
C. D.D.C. Finds Daimler To Preclude General Jurisdiction
D.D.C. litigation of § 2333(a) cases produced a markedly
different Daimler analysis compared to the approach in Sokolow.  
The first D.D.C. court to face the issue of whether Daimler 
precluded the PLO and PA in § 2333(a) cases was Estate of 
Klieman v. Palestinian Authority.  The case was brought after 
Esther Klieman, an American schoolteacher, was killed by a 
Palestinian terrorist who open fired at a public bus in Israel.126 
Two years after the filing, the PLO and PA moved to dismiss 
the action for lack of personal jurisdiction.127  More specifically, 
the defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not satisfy their 
burden of demonstrating that the defendants had minimum 
contacts within the U.S.128  This defense was rejected on the 
grounds that it was generally accepted among courts that the 
PLO and PA engaged in sufficient activities in the U.S. so as to 
satisfy minimum contacts.129 
Similar to the Sokolow case, after the Daimler decision, the 
PLO and the PA moved for reconsideration on the court’s 
personal jurisdiction ruling.130  In analyzing the defendants’ 
motion, the court compared the pre- and post-Daimler standards.  
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Sokolow IV, No. 04 CIVIL 00397 (GBD), 2015 WL 10852003, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 1, 2015), vacated, Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 
2016); 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). 
126 Complaint at 23–25, Estate of Klieman v. Palestinian Auth. (Klieman I), 467 
F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 1:04-cv-01173).
127 Klieman I, 467 F. Supp. 2d 107, 110 (D.D.C. 2006).
128 See id. 
129 Id. at 113 (“Other federal courts in the United States have determined that 
both the PA and the PLO have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States 
to permit suit here consistent with the Due Process Clause of the 
Constitution . . . [and] [t]his Court agrees.”). 
130 Klieman II, 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 239 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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The court noted that before Daimler, courts exercised personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if they (1) had minimum 
contacts within the forum and (2) could have reasonably foreseen 
being subject to D.D.C. jurisdiction.131  The court noted that after 
Daimler, plaintiffs must additionally establish that the 
defendant’s minimum contacts essentially render them at home 
in the U.S.132 
The court acknowledged that the PLO and PA had numerous 
contacts within the U.S.,133 precisely the same contacts the 
Sokolow court considered.  However, unlike the Sokolow court, 
the court focused its analysis on the defendants’ activities 
internationally to determine whether those U.S. contacts could 
essentially render the defendants at home in the U.S.134  The 
court emphasized that the PLO was based in the West Bank and 
the PA was based in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; thus, a 
majority of their activities occurred in these locations.135  
Additionally, comparing the defendants’ U.S. contacts with their 
international contacts highlighted that their U.S. operations only 
represented a small portion of their overall activity.136  The court 
further compared these facts with those of Daimler and 
concluded that the PLO and PA’s contacts with the U.S. were 
fewer than Daimler’s contacts with California.137  Hence, the 
court concluded that under Daimler, the PLO and PA could not 
be rendered at home in the U.S and granted summary 
judgment.138 
In addition to Estate of Klieman, two subsequent ATA civil 
cases have been brought in the D.D.C. courts: Livnat v. 
Palestinian Authority and Safra v. Palestinian Authority.139  Both 
of these cases reached the same conclusion: the PA could not be 
summoned to a U.S. court, because it is not at home in the U.S. 
Importantly, the court in Livnat addressed the plaintiff’s 
131 Id. at 242 (articulating the International Shoe approach). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 245–46. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 245. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. at 242, 245 (“Daimler’s U.S. subsidiary, its continuous business 
operations, and commercial sales accounting for 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales 
were insufficient to support general jurisdiction.”). 
138 Id. at 250. 
139 82 F. Supp. 3d 19 (D.D.C. 2015); 82 F. Supp. 3d 37 (D.D.C. 2015). 
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argument that Daimler does not apply to organizations, such as 
the PA.140  The court responded by saying that Daimler is not 
necessarily limited to corporate entities simply because the 
Daimler Court did not explicitly state that the standard applies 
to entities other than corporations.141  In reading Daimler 
broadly, the court stated the focus should be on how to apply the 
standard to organizations like the PA and not whether these 
organizations are subject to Daimler.142 
In determining how to apply the Daimler standard to these 
organizations, the court relied on the analysis performed in 
another D.D.C. case, Toumazou v. Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus.143  In Toumazou, the court was tasked with applying 
Daimler to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a 
“democratic republic” that governs a portion of Cyprus, but is not 
recognized by the U.S. as a sovereign government.144  The TRNC 
was deemed to be at home in Cyprus, the land it governed, 
because a majority of its activities were carried out there.145  The 
Livnat court concluded that because TRNC was deemed at home 
in Cyprus, the PA must therefore be deemed at home in the West 
Bank—the PA’s governing land and center of activities.146  The 
court explained that drawing this inference was permissible 
because “[i]t is common sense that the single ascertainable place 
where a government such a[s] the Palestinian Authority should 
be amenable to suit for all purposes is the place where it 
governs.”147  Additionally, the court listed some of the PA’s 
activities that lend support to the conclusion that the PA is a 
government operating abroad: (1) consular services and 
(2) services like community outreach and cultural events.148
In all three D.D.C. cases, the courts expressly stated
disagreement with the Sokolow court’s personal jurisdiction 
ruling.  The D.D.C. courts disagreed with the Sokolow court’s 
finding that the defendants failed to rebut the plaintiff’s evidence 
by establishing that the PA was at home somewhere else besides 
140 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 27. 
141 Id. at 28. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 30; 71 F. Supp. 3d 7 (2014). 
144 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30. 
145 Toumazou, 71 F. Supp. 3d at 15. 
146 Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 30. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 30–31. 
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the U.S.149  In doing this, the D.D.C. courts stated the Sokolow 
court impermissibly shifted the burden from the plaintiff, who 
must establish the defendant is at home in the U.S., to the 
defendants to establish they are at home somewhere else.150 
D. Second Circuit Reverses Sokolow and Adopts D.D.C. Position
On August 31, 2016, the Second Circuit rendered its decision
reversing the district court’s holding that it had personal 
jurisdiction over the PLO and PA.151  After the landmark jury 
decision awarding millions of dollars to the plaintiffs, the 
defendants sought to overturn it by again arguing lack of 
personal jurisdiction.152  The Second Circuit disagreed with the 
lower court and found that it could not constitutionally exercise 
personal jurisdiction over the PLO.153  First, the court found that 
Daimler applied—even though the PLO and PA are not 
corporations—because the Supreme Court did not intend to 
distinguish between corporations and unincorporated 
associations in performing the at-home analysis.154  Therefore, 
the court proceeded to perform the at-home analysis and found 
that the evidence showed the defendants were at home in 
Palestine.155  It dismissed the lower court’s conclusion that the 
defendants’ U.S. contacts could render them at home in the U.S. 
Second, the court refused to interpret the facts of the case as 
“exceptional” and, therefore, out of Daimler’s realm, which would 
have allowed for a different personal jurisdictional analysis.156 
In finding that the district court did not have personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants, the Second Circuit vacated the 
district court’s judgment and remanded the case with 
instructions to dismiss the case for lack of personal 
149 Klieman II, 82 F. Supp. 3d 237, 246 (D.D.C. 2015). 
150 Id.; Livnat, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 31; Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 
37, 49 (D.D.C. 2015). 
151 Waldman v. Palestine Liberation Org., Nos. 15–3135–cv (L); 15–3151–cv 
(XAP), 2016 WL 4537369, at *20 (2d Cir. 2016). 
152 Id. at *7. 
153 Id. at *13. 
154 Id. at *10. 
155 Id. at *11. 
156 Id. at *13. 
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jurisdiction.157  The plaintiffs have expressed interest in 
requesting a review by the full Second Circuit or the possibility of 
filing an appeal to the Supreme Court.158 
III. THE SUPREME COURT NEEDS TO EXEMPT APPLICATION OF
DAIMLER IN § 2333(A) CASES 
Whether foreign sponsors of terrorism can be haled into U.S. 
courts should be addressed by the United States Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court must carve out an exception to Daimler by 
exempting plaintiffs in § 2333(a) cases from satisfying the “at-
home” test when proceeding against foreign sponsors of 
terrorism.  Due process, the touchstone of determining general 
jurisdiction, demands fundamental fairness and substantial 
justice.  By continuing to bring these foreign sponsors of 
terrorism into federal court, the Court would be balancing (1) the 
U.S.’s interest in providing a forum for American victims of
terrorism and (2) foreign defendants’ interest in not being forced
to defend actions in a jurisdiction with which they have no
connection.  In following these principles, the Supreme Court
would appropriately narrow Daimler while satisfying
fundamental fairness and substantial justice.159
By exempting Daimler in § 2333(a) cases, plaintiffs would 
still need to prove that the court has general jurisdiction under 
International Shoe by proving: (1) systematic contacts and 
(2) reasonableness.  The International Shoe standard is not only
the standard that foreign defendants in § 2333(a) cases have
been subjected to for the past two decades, but also the only
fundamentally fair option.  If these defendants have systematic
and continuous contacts in the U.S. and purposefully avail
themselves of the benefits of the laws and protections of the U.S.,
American citizens should be able to exercise their right to hold
them accountable for their involvement in international
terrorism.  Otherwise, § 2333(a) serves very little purpose.
157 Id. at *20. 
158 Julian, supra note 96. 
159 See Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Be Careful What You Wish for: 
Goodyear, Daimler, and the Evisceration of General Jurisdiction, 64 EMORY L.J. 
2001, 2012 (2014). 
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IV. DAIMLER DOES NOT APPLY TO § 2333(A) CASES
Applying Daimler in cases where the PLO and PA are named 
foreign defendants is only one example highlighting the 
constitutional implications of applying the “at-home” test to 
foreign defendants allegedly sponsoring terrorism in § 2333(a) 
cases.  The Islasmic State of Iraq and the Levant, a U.S. 
designated foreign terrorist organization that has inflitrated the 
U.S. media and Internet to gain support and funding from U.S. 
citizens to carry out overseas attacks, is just another example of 
a terrorist group that will be immune to civil litigation by virtue 
of never being truly at home in the U.S.  Cases brought under 
§ 2333(a) are symbolic, sensitive, and meant to compensate
victims harmed by international acts of terrorism.  By applying
Daimler to § 2333(a) cases, it becomes nearly impossible for
American citizens to exercise this right against not only the PLO
and PA but a variety of foreign actors that by virtue of their
mission or policies will never be at home in the U.S.
A. Daimler’s “At-home” Test Undermines § 2333(a) and
Destabilizes National Security
Foreign organizations will be virtually immune to § 2333(a)
cases if Daimler applies, because organizations like the PLO and 
PA will rarely be reachable under general jurisdiction.  Foreign 
organizations can be brought into U.S. courts under theories of 
specific or general jurisdiction.160  To be brought into the U.S. 
under specific jurisdiction, the cause of action must have arose 
from or must be related to the forum.161  Markedly, in Daimler, 
the United States Supreme Court attributed the growth in 
specific jurisdiction to the limited need for general jurisdiction.162  
However, even though specific jurisdiction is more frequently 
utilized, it “is not sufficiently broad to eliminate the need for a 
more generous scope of general jurisdiction.”163  This is best 
illustrated by the fact that § 2333(a) defendants cannot be haled 
into federal court under specific jurisdiction because § 2333(a) 
160 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923–24 
(2011). 
161 Id. 
162 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 757–58 (2014). 
163 Arthur & Freer, supra note 159, at 2013. 
1138 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1115  
cases specifically deal with international acts.164  With specific 
jurisdiction unavailable, plaintiffs can only reach these foreign 
defendants with general jurisdiction, but organizations like the 
PLO and the PA will likely never be at home in the U.S. by way 
of their mission statement; U.S. plaintiffs seeking to sue these 
defendants will be left with no domestic forum options.165 
Because organizations, such as the PLO and PA, will be 
virtually immune to civil litigation and free to continue backing 
terrorism, the deterrent effect of the ATA is diminished.  The 
bill’s purpose was not only to merely compensate U.S. citizens.  It 
was meant to deter terrorist groups from (1) maintaining assets 
in the U.S.; (2) benefitting from U.S. investments; and 
(3) soliciting funds within the U.S.166  It was also meant to
encourage other countries to pass similar legislation, which
would effectively create significant hurdles for terrorist
operations.167  These purposes cannot be fulfilled if U.S. plaintiffs
cannot acquire jurisdiction over § 2333(a) foreign defendants.
Not only does this undermine the ATA and the injured 
plaintiff’s right to a remedy, but also it weakens the nation’s 
counterterrorism efforts.168  Specifically, the United States in a 
Statement of Interest submitted in the Sokolow case stated: 
The ability of victims to recover under the ATA also advances 
U.S. national security interests.  The law reflects our nation’s 
compelling interest in combatting and deterring terrorism at 
every level, including by eliminating sources of terrorist funding 
and holding sponsors of terrorism accountable for their actions. 
Imposing civil liability on those who commit or sponsor acts of 
164 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012); see also supra Section I.A (defining specific 
jurisdiction). 
165 See Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t should be 
obvious . . . the ultimate effect of the majority’s approach . . . . Under the majority’s 
rule, for example, a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign 
hotel owned by a multinational conglomerate will be unable to hold the hotel to 
account in a single U.S. court, even if the hotel company has a massive presence in 
multiple States . . . . [T]he majority’s approach would preclude the[se types of] 
plaintiffs . . . from seeking recourse anywhere in the United States even if no other 
judicial system was available to provide relief.”). The D.D.C. courts conceded to this 
when it concluded the PLO and PA can only be at home in the place in which they 
govern. Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 30 (D.D.C. 2015); Safra v. 
Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2015). 
166 Hearings, supra note 1, at 12 (statement of Alan J. Kreczko). 
167 Id. 
168 Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 2, Sokolow v. 
Palestine Liberation Org., No. 04-CV-397 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2015). 
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terrorism is an important means of deterring and defeating 
terrorist activity.  Further, compensation of victims at the 
expense of those who have committed or supported terrorist acts 
contributes to U.S. efforts to disrupt the financing of terrorism 
and to impede the flow of funds or other support to terrorist 
activity.169 
Without funding, terrorist operations cannot be sustained.170  
Section 2333(a) was designed to diminish terrorism financing by 
allowing victims to collect damages.171  If Daimler applied to 
§ 2333(a) cases, the burden of establishing a foreign sponsor of
terrorism at home in the U.S. would make it nearly impossible to
assert jurisdiction over foreign defendants and would hinder the
nation’s counterterrorism efforts and the ATA.
B. Daimler’s “At-Home” Test was Not Written with an Eye
Towards § 2333(a) Defendants
1. Foreign Sponsors of Terrorism Fail To Satisfy Daimler’s
Economic Policymaking Justification
The Daimler Court imposed the at-home test to establish a
jurisdictional standard through which defendants could easily 
ascertain the U.S. forums in which they could be subject to 
litigation.  The Court focused on corporations and made clear 
that it was restricting lawsuits against corporations to their 
place of incorporation and principal place of business, because 
those forums are easily ascertainable.172  The underlying 
rationale for creating a standard that is easily ascertainable was 
based on principles of international economic policymaking.173  
These principles rest on the theory that an “expansive exercise of 
169 Id. 
170 Taylor, supra note 6. 
171 Hearings, supra note 1, at 12. 
172 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014). Despite the Court 
striving to create easily ascertainable forums for corporations, corporations after 
Daimler are still unclear as to where they can be reached pursuant to general 
jurisdiction. See Harold K. Gordon & Sevan Ogulluk, New York Tests Daimler’s 
Limits with Its Consent-to-Jurisdiction Rule for Foreign Companies Registering To 
Do Business in the State, JONES DAY (June 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/New-
York-Tests-iDaimleris-Limits-with-Its-Consent-to-Jurisdiction-Rule-for-Foreign-
Companies-Registering-to-Do-Business-in-the-State-06-29-2015. 
173 Lauren Carasik, Supreme Court Ruling Shields Corporations from 
Accountability, W. NEW ENG. UNIV. SCH. L. (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://digital 
commons.law.wne.edu/media/104. 
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jurisdiction would lead to unpredictability about where 
corporations could be sued, thereby discouraging foreign 
investment.”174  Thus, the Court’s reasoning offers greater 
protection to foreign defendants by limiting their liability in 
order to maintain economic stability in the U.S.175 
Plainly read, this reasoning is directed towards corporations 
that promote or fuel the U.S. economy,176 not organizations 
similar to the PLO and PA that are not involved in promoting 
economic activity in America.  This is further supported by the 
position the United States took in its Amicus Curiae Brief 
submitted in the Daimler case: 
In some instances, the interests of the United States are served 
by permitting suits against foreign entities to go forward in 
domestic courts.  But expansive assertions of general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations may operate to the 
detriment of the United States’ diplomatic relations and its 
foreign trade and economic interests.177 
Terrorism-related cases are an “instance” in which the U.S.’s 
interests are better served.  The primary purpose for the PLO’s 
and PA’s presence in the U.S. is not economically related but 
instead focuses on endorsing liberation, establishing a 
Palestinian region, and raising funds to assist the process.178  
174 Id. 
175 Kaitlin Hanigan, Comment, A Blunder of Supreme Propositions: General 
Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 291, 299 (2014) 
(“[T]he Daimler opinion marks a shift away from concerns of fairness and 
predictability—the very principles underpinning personal jurisdiction—in favor of 
protecting big business from jurisdictional vulnerability.”); see also Stephanie 
Denker, Comment, The Future of General Jurisdiction: The Effects of Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 145, 166–69 (2014) (“Companies prefer to 
invest and do business in places where they can predict the jurisdictional 
consequences of their actions.”). 
176 At the time, there was a real threat of companies scaling back U.S. 
investments and instead investing in other countries. For example, a group of 
German entities stated in a brief of Amici Curiae: 
Since these Bauman-influenced decisions, the German Viega Companies 
have been expanding investments in other countries, such as ones in Asia, 
with more predictable legal environments. Absent reversal, the German 
Viega Companies will consider divesting in the United States, and will 
recommend to other similarly situated companies to do the same. 
Brief for Petitioner, DaimlerChrysler IV, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) (No. 11-965), 2013 
WL 3421894, at *4. 
177 Id. at *1. 
178 See Sokolow I, No. 04 CV 00397(GBD), 2011 WL 1345086, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 30, 2011). 
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Certainly, the Supreme Court did not intend to give equal 
protection to both foreign corporations that invest vast amounts 
of money in the U.S. and foreign organizations using their 
American presence to promote a mission that is related to 
sponsorship of terrorist acts.179 
2. Daimler Never Intended To Blanket All Foreign Defendants
and Strip U.S. Terrorism Victims of a Remedy
The plain language of the Daimler opinion is evidence that
the Court did not intend to blanket all foreign defendants under 
its new at-home standard.180  If the Court wanted the test to 
apply to every foreign defendant, the Court would have explicitly 
stated so or structured its opinion broadly, instead of focusing on 
corporations and the economic policymaking behind it.181  
Notably, “it said nothing about how one might determine where 
noncorporate associations (including labor unions, partnerships, 
and limited liability companies) might be ‘at home.’ ”182  Even 
within the context of corporations, the Court admitted a foreign 
defendant may, in exceptional cases, be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in a forum other than the two corporate paradigm 
forums the Court listed, but it did not address when this 
exception would apply nor did it provide factors courts should 
look at to determine if a corporation falls within this category.183 
Foreign sponsors of terrorism are the type of defendant that 
should merit such an exception to Daimler.  Organizations like 
the PLO and the PA are unincorporated associations.184  These 
organizations do not have a place of incorporation or principal 
179 See Kredo, supra note 101. 
180 Vivek Krishnamurthy, Daimler AG v. Bauman: In Latest ATS Decision, the 
Supreme Court Limits Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts over Multinational Corporations, 
FOLEY HOAG LLP (Jan. 18, 2014), http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2014/01/18/daimler-
ag-v-bauman-for-corporations-home-is-now-where-the-lawsuits-must-now-be (“What 
is a surprise, however, is that in deciding [Daimler], the Court substantially 
tightened the law of jurisdiction in both U.S. federal and state courts as it applies to 
large corporations.”). 
181 C.f. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (explaining a new 
general jurisdiction approach using broad language so as to not limit the holding to 
any particular defendant). 
182 Arthur & Freer, supra note 159, at 2005; see also Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 
82 F. Supp. 3d 19, 28 (D.D.C. 2015) (“[T]he Supreme Court did not enumerate 
paradigm all-purpose forums for other types of organizations.”). 
183 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.19 (2014). 
184 Klieman I, 467 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113–14 (D.D.C. 2006). 
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place of business, because they are not corporations.185  
Therefore, where these organizations are at home is not as 
straightforward under the Court’s guidelines.  The underlying 
principle of the Court’s jurisdictional at-home test is, therefore, 
weakened because these defendants are not provided notice as to 
where they are amenable to litigation.186 
Public policy supports the premise that foreign sponsors of 
terrorism should be exempted from Daimler’s personal 
jurisdiction analysis.  It is against public policy to allow the PLO 
and PA to operate in the U.S. while concurrently killing and 
injuring American citizens abroad.187  There must be some 
protection for American citizens outside the U.S. border.188  
Allowing U.S. citizens to civilly attack organizations that aid 
terrorist attacks can provide some protection because, if Daimler 
does not apply, these organizations could potentially face a 
lawsuit and fatal monetary damages that could impede their 
terrorism financing and, thus, reduce the frequency of terrorist 
attacks.189  The Daimler Court was not thinking about terrorism 
and terrorism-related defendants when it opined the “at-home” 
test and, hence, the test should not be extended to all foreign 
defendants. 
185 Safra v. Palestinian Auth., 82 F. Supp. 3d 37, 48 (D.D.C. 2015). 
186 Before Daimler, the PLO and PA were on notice that they were subject to 
American jurisdiction under the International Shoe anaylsis. E.g., Klinghoffer v. 
S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione 
Straordinaria, 795 F. Supp. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Knox v. Palestine Liberation 
Org., 248 F.R.D. 420, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Klieman I, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 113; Estate 
of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 325 F. Supp. 2d 15, 59 (D.R.I. 2004); Biton v. 
Palestinian Interim Self-Government Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 179–80 (D.D.C. 
2004). 
187 See Public’s Policy Priorities Reflect Changing Conditions at Home and 
Abroad, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/ 
2015/01/15/publics-policy-priorities-reflect-changing-conditions-at-home-and-abroad 
(noting that public policy in America has favored defending against terrorism as the 
top priority consecutively for three years). 
188 See Worldwide Caution, U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE (Sept. 9, 2016), http://travel. 
state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/worldwide-caution.html (explaining 
the continuing threat of terrorism against U.S. citizens and interests around the 
world). 
189 See Protecting U.S. Citizens Abroad from Terrorism: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Int’l Operations and Terrorism of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Sen. Boxer, Chairman, Subcomm. of Int’l 
Operations and Terrorism) (“Congress has a responsibility and a duty to continue 
our oversight role in reviewing the threat that terrorism poses to U.S. citizens 
abroad.”). 
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C. Due Process Demands Fairness, and It Is Not Fair to Subject
§ 2333(a) Defendants to Daimler’s “At-Home” Test
Application of the at-home test to the facts in Daimler
comports more with fundamental fairness than application of the 
test in § 2333(a) cases.  The facts of Daimler were an outlier; the 
case dealt with a foreign plaintiff, a foreign defendant, and a 
cause of action that arose in a foreign country with which the 
defendant was not directly involved.190  If the Court found 
general jurisdiction to exist, essentially every foreign corporation 
engaged in some business in the U.S. would be amenable to suit 
in the U.S. by either domestic or foreign plaintiffs for causes of 
action that accrued in any part of the world.  Certainly, this 
would violate due process. 
However, these circumstances are not present in § 2333(a) 
cases.  First, these defendants have been put on notice since the 
enactment of § 2333(a) and by subsequent cases that have been 
brought pursuant to it.  Second, these defendants have harmed 
an American.191  These proceedings will always yield a domestic 
interest, because Congress only granted private American 
citizens, including survivors, estates and heirs, the constitutional 
right to bring § 2333(a) cases.192  Third, the statute specifically 
allows for causes of actions that accrue internationally.193  
Therefore, Congress has put foreign defendants on constructive 
notice, warning them that they will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
if they engage in terrorism and injure or murder an American.194  
This was a major focus of the statute, because Congress wanted 
to ensure that foreign defendants could be held accountable for 
their involvement in foreign terrorist attacks.195  Subsequent case 
190 Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 153, 169–70 (2014) (“[T]he facts in Daimler were another example of the kind of 
outlier general jurisdiction that puts those defending such a holding on the outlier 
edges of justifications for the doctrine.”). 
191 See 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2012). 
192 Id.; Sokolow I, No. 04 CV 00397(GBD), 2011 WL 1345086, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 30, 2011) (“The reality is that ATA litigation often involves foreign individuals 
and entities, and thereby, a statutory cause of action for international terrorism 
exists. There is a strong inherent interest of the United States and Plaintiffs in 
litigating ATA claims in the United States.”). 
193 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333(a), 2331(1)(C). 
194 See § 2333(a). 
195 See Hearings, supra note 1, at 3 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley). 
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law has interpreted the statute to apply to secondary foreign 
sponsors of terrorism, as well.196  Hence, § 2333(a) cases present a 
markedly different set of facts than were present in Daimler. 
CONCLUSION 
American citizens should continue to have the opportunity to 
bring civil actions in federal courts against those that contribute 
to heinous acts of international terrorism that injure or kill 
Americans abroad.  This was the stated legislative purpose of 
§ 2333(a), to compensate injured Americans and send a message
to terrorist organizations that American citizens can and will
civilly pursue terrorist assets.  Americans can continue
exercising this right if the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Daimler is not applied to these sensitive and narrow
group of cases.
The Court in Daimler was not thinking about § 2333(a) cases 
when it constructed its restrictive “at-home” test.  Carving out an 
exception for § 2333(a) defendants will keep Daimler’s at-home 
standard good law, while concurrently avoiding unfairness to 
American victims of terrorism.  Instead, plaintiffs should only 
have to prove general jurisdiction over § 2333(a) defendants 
pursuant to International Shoe.  In doing so, the Court will allow 
American citizens to have their day in court, while still providing 
foreign organizations notice as to where they may be amenable to 
suit. 
Terrorism has become an unavoidable part of our lives, 
especially in the modern society where international terrorism is 
growing at a faster rate than the world has ever seen before. 
History is the best indicator that terrorism can happen at any 
moment to anyone.  Unfortunately, American citizens have 
limited individual recourse in fighting terrorism.  The courts 
should not strip tools provided to the American people by 
Congress to combat it. 
196 See supra Section I.B (explaining the Boim and Wultz cases). 
